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JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken from the 30 November 1995, JUDGMENT OF 
DISMISSAL pursuant to Respondent's 2 October 1995, MOTION TO DISMISS, 
the Honorable G. Rand Beacham, presiding. 
Pursuant to the granting of Respondent's pre-answer MOTION TO 
DISMISS from the District Court below, Petitioner appeals to the Utah Court 
of Appeals, which has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the 
Utah Judicial Code. U.C.A. §78-2(a)-3(2)(a), also Article 8 Section 5, Utah State 
Constitution. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
POINT #1 . DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS? IN OTHER 
WORDS, WAS PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW OF G. R. A. M. A. REQUEST DENIALS FATALLY 
FLAWED? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Standard of Review considered under a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim, is that all reasonable inferences made with regard to 
the original complaint (PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF G. R. A. M. A. 
REQUEST DENIALS, in this case) and the facts alleged are to be construed as true 
and considered in a light most favorable to the Petitioner. 
1. FREEGARD v. FIRST W. NATL BANK 738 P.2d 614 (Utah 1987) 
2 . MOUNTEER v. UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO.. 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991) 
3 . RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS INC. ETAL. V. VIRGINIA ETAL.. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) 
3 . SOC Y OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS v. SECRETARY OF LABOR. 
616F.Supp. 569 (D.Utah 1985) 
3 . THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS v. BRIGGS ETAL.. 
675 F.Supp 1308 (D.Utah 1987) 
POINT #2. DOES THE UTAH GOVERNMENT RECORDS ACCESS AND 
MANAGEMENT ACT. U.CA. §63-2-101 ETSEQ, IDENTIFY, 
DEFINE, OR EVEN CONTEMPLATE "NON-RECORDS?" 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This issue on review is governed by the clear and plain language of the 
statute and the statutes ' definition of the term "non-record." This review is 
an issue of first impression by an appellate court in Utah. Statutes and 
appellate court decisions which may bear influence on the issues under 
review might include: 
1. Utah Code Annotated. §63-2-101 etseq., [Governmental Records Access 
and Management Act (G. JR. A. M. A.)] 
2. Washington Countu Ordinance. #529 et seq. 
POINT #3. DID THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY APPLY U. C. A. §63-2-
103(18)(b)(v9 TO PETITIONER'S CASE? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This issue on review is governed by the clear and plain language of the 
statute and the application of U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(a) in contradistinction 
to U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(b)(vi) as applied to Petitioner's case This review is 
an issue of first impression by an appellate court in Utah. Statutes and 
appellate court decisions which may bear influence on the issues under 
review might include: 
1. U. C. A. §63-2-103(17) 
2. U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(a) 
3 . U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(b)(vi) 
4. U.CA. §63-2-201(2) 
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POINT #4. CAN PETITIONER BE EXPECTED OR OBLIGATED BY HIS 
GOVERNMENT TO TRAVEL BEYOND THE GEOGRAPHIC 
BOUNDARIES OF THE COUNTY IN WHICH HE LIVES, IN 
ORDER FOR HIM TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO THE RECORDS 
HE SEEKS. IN OTHER WORDS, IS THERE AN ISSUE OF 
CONVENIENCE AT PLAY TO DENY PETITIONER ACCESS 
TO THE RECORDS HE SEEKS? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Standard of Review considered under a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, is that all reasonable inferences made with regard to the 
original complaint (a PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF G. R. A. M. A. REQUEST 
DENIALS in this case) are to be construed as true and in a light most favorable to 
the Petitioner. 
1. MOUNTEER v. UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY. 823 P,2d 1055 (Utah 1991) 
2 . SOCIETY OF PROF. JOURNALISTS v. BRIGGS. 675 F.Supp 1308 (D.Utah 1987) 
3 . RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS INC. ETAL. V. VIRGINIA ETAL.. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) 
VERBATIM RECITALS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Constitution. Article 8, Section 5 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited 
by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The 
district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The 
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by 
statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, there shall 
be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court 
with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) 
(b) how presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall 
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the 
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack 
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) 
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of 
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure 
to join an indispensable party. 
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Utah Code Annotated 63-2-103(17) 
"Public record" means a record that is not private, controlled, or protected and that 
is not exempt from disclosure as provided in Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b). 
Utah Code Annotated 63-2-103(18)(a) 
"Record" means all books, letters, documents, papers, maps, plans, photographs, 
films, cards, tapes, recordings, electronic data, or other documentary materials 
regardless of physical form or characteristics; 
Utah Code Annotated 63-2-103(18)(b)(vi) 
(b) "Record" does not mean: 
(vi) books and other materials that are cataloged, indexed, or inventoried and 
contained in the collections of libraries open to the public, regardless of physical 
form or characteristics of the material; 
Utah Code Annotated 63-2-201(2) 
All records are public unless otherwise expressly provided by statute. 
Utah Code Annotated 63-2-20l(3)(b) 
(3) The following records are not public; 
(b) records to which access is restricted pursuant to court rule, another state statute, 
federal statute, or federal regulation, including records for which access is 
governed or restricted as a condition of participation in a state or federal program 
or for receiving state or federal funds. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner sought Judicial review of Respondent's denial of access to 
public records pursuant to the Utah Government Records Access and 
Management Act (G. R. A. M. A.), U.CA. §63-2-101 et seq, also Washington 
Countu Ordinance #529 et seq. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
1. On 8, 9, 10, 11, and 14 August 1995, Petitioner/Appellant physically 
attempted to gain access to and review certain public records housed at the 
Washington County Attorney's Office in St. George, Utah. (Record, pages 2 
thru 5) 
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2. On 9 August 1995, Petitioner submitted a written G. R. A. M. A. 
request to the custodian of the records of the Washington County Attorneys' 
Office, which was denied by Eric Ludlow, by letter on 16 August 1995. 
(Record, page 5, f #31) 
3. On 11 August 1995, pursuant to the in person denials of 8, 9, 10, & 
11 August 1995, and pursuant to Washington County Ordinance No. 529, at 1 
10(B)(1), Petitioner filed an administrative appeal to the Washington County 
Commission. (Record, pages 2 thru 6, f S #1, #4, #11, #12, #21, #22, #24, 
#25, & #34) 
4. Twenty-One (21) days then passed without the County Commission 
responding to Petitioner's administrative appeal, and Petitioner sought remedy 
in District Court for judicial review of the Washington Countys' denials of 
Petitioner's G. R. A. M. A. Requests, on 8 September 1995. (Record, page 6, 
<J #34 and Record, page 1) 
5. Respondent/Appellee was served the SUMMONS and PETITION on 
12 September 1995, by one (1) Gary Stubbs, a local process server. (Record, 
page 11) 
6. The RETURN OF SERVICE was filed with the Fifth Judicial District 
Court on 14 September 1995. (Record, page 12) 
7. On or about 2 October 1995, Respondent caused to be filed its 
MOTION TO DISMISS, arguing that the documents sought by the Petitioner 
were "non-records" "subject to GRAMA." (Record, page 17) 
8. On 3 October 1995, the District Court entered a DEFAULT 
CERTIFICATE against the Respondent. (Record, page 13) 
9. On 11 October 1995, Petitioner filed his OPPOSITION TO 
RESPONDENTS MOTION TO DISMISS. (Record, page 43) 
10. On 11 October 1995, Petitioner filed his MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. (Record, page 6, <R #48) 
11. On 23 October 1995, Petitioner filed a NOTICE TO SUBMIT on 
Respondents' MOTION TO DISMISS. (Record, page 57) 
12. On 23 October 1995, Petitioner filed a NOTICE TO SUBMIT on his 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. (Record, page 59) 
13. On 26 October 1995, Petitioner caused an AFFIDAVIT OF 
PREJUDICE to be filed against Judge G. Rand Beacham. (Record, page 61) 
14. On 13 November 1995, the Court issued an ORDER CERTIFYING 
AFFIDAVIT OF PREJUDICE TO JUDGE J . PHILIP EVES. (Record, page 142) 
15. On 15 November 1995, Respondent caused to be filed its MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT CERTIFICATE and MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. 
(Record, pages 64 & 66 respectively) 
16. On 17 November 1995, Respondent caused to be filed its 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS [sic] NOTICE TO SUBMIT THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS; AND MOTION AND MEMORANDUM TO ACCEPT REPLY 
MEMORANDUM, DEFENDANTS' [sic] REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS, and SECOND NOTICE TO SUBMIT MOTION TO 
DISMISS. (Record, pages 91, 94, & 139 respectively) 
17. On 17 November 1995, Respondent also caused to be filed its 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S [sic] NOTICE TO SUBMIT THE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DEFENDANTS [sic] RULE 56(f) MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF'S [sic] MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS [sic] 
RULE 56 (f) MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO 
PLAINTIFF'S [sic] MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, and AFFIDAVIT OF 
3RUCE M. PRITCHETT, JR. (Record, pages 78, 81, 83, &, 88 respectively) 
Court of Appeals Case No. 960021 CA — APPPi I * U T - C o m r c 
18. On 22 November 1995, the Court entered its RULING regarding 
Petitioner's 26 October 1995, AFFIDAVIT OF PREJUDICE, denying Petitioner's 
effort to recuse Judge Beacham. (Record, page 143) 
19. On 30 November 1995, the Court below rendered its JUDGMENT OF 
DISMISSAL, which was caused to be mailed to the Petitioner on 1 December 
1995. (Record, page 147) 
20. On 3 January 1995, Petitioner filed his NOTICE OF APPEAL in this 
matter. (Record, page 153) 
Statement of the Facts 
1. On Tuesday, 8 August 1995, at approximately 8:30 am., 
Petitioner attempted to gain access to the Law Library at the Washington 
County Attorney's Office at 178 N. 200 East in St. George, Utah, to exercise 
his 1st Amendment Right to access to public documents contained at that 
location. (Record, page 2 5 #Ij 
2. There is a new partition built in the reception area of the County 
Attorney's Office, with a locked door blocking access to the Law Library. 
(Record, page 2 <fl #2) 
3. Upon discovering the blocked access to the Law Library, 
Petitioner asked the receptionist (Jane Doe #1) who was sitting there, for 
access to the Law Library. This constitutes Petitioner's first (1st), in person, 
G. R. A. M. A. Request. (Record, page 2 <J #3) 
4. The receptionist informed Petitioner that the Law Library was no 
longer available or open to the public, and she made no effort to offer or 
allow him beyond the door blocking access. (Record, page 2 <J #4) 
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5. Petitioner requested to speak to someone with more authority than 
her and asked the receptionist to get someone else for him to speak to. 
(Record, page 2 q #5) 
6. Jane Doe #1 left the reception area and went back into the office 
area, beyond Petitioner's view. A secretary for one of the attorneys returned 
(Jane Doe #2)) and informed Petitioner that the Law Library was not public, it 
was for the exclusive use of the Washington County attorneys. (Record, page 
2q#6) 
7. Jane Doe #2 informed Petitioner that all the Law books and 
information he desired to review or obtain could be found at the Washington 
County Public Library over on Main Street. She also stated that all the law 
books contained in the Law Library at the Washington County Attorneys office 
were contained on CD's (compact disc) for use on the computer terminals at 
the Public Library. (Record, page 2 q #7) 
8. Petitioner asked to speak to Eric Ludlow, and was informed that he 
was not there. Petitioner asked to speak to any other attorney in the office and 
was informed they were all over at the courthouse. (Record, page 3 q #8) 
9. As of 8 August 1995, at approximately 10:30 am. there were no law 
books or legal reference books available on CD or by any other media at the 
Washington County Library, on Main Street, in St. George, Utah. Jane Doe 
#2's representation to Petitioner was a lie and therefore a fraud. (Record, 
page 3 q #9) 
10. The above facts stated i n l l t t l through #9, constituted Petitioner's 
irst (1st) G. R. A. M. A. request denial by the Washington County Attorney's 
Dffice. (Record, page 3 q #10) 
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11. On Wednesday, 9 August 1995, at approximately 8:45 am., 
Petitioner again attempted to gain access to the Law Library at the 
Washington County Attorney's Office at 178 N. 200 East in St. George, 
Utah, to exercise his 1st Amendment Right to access to public documents 
contained at that location. (Record, page 3 <fl #11) 
12. Petitioner again asked the receptionist (Jane Doe #1} who was sitting 
there, for access to the Law Library. The receptionist informed Petitioner that the 
Law Library was not available or open to the public, and she made no effort to 
offer or allow him beyond the door blocking access. This constitutes Petitioner's 
second (2nd), in person, G. R. A. M. A. Request. (Recordf page 3 <f  #12) 
13. On first entering the County Attorney's Office, Brent Langston, an 
Assistant Washington County Attorney, had just preceded Petitioner into the 
office, by about 30 seconds. While Petitioner waited for the receptionist to 
answer a call from the back, he could hear Brent Langston conversing with 
others in back and out of view from the reception area. (Record, page 3 <fl #13) 
14. Petitioner then asked Jane Doe #1 for her name, and she asked 
him to repeat his question. Petitioner again asked her for her name and she 
refused to give it to him. (Record, page 3 <f  #14) 
15. Petitioner informed Jane Doe #1 that she was a public servant 
and she again refused to give him her name. (Record, page 4 <J #15) 
16. Petitioner asked to speak to Eric Ludlow and Jane Doe #1 
informed him that Ludlow was not there. (Record, page 4% #16) 
17. Petitioner asked to speak to any attorney that was there and 
Jane Doe #1 advised him that there were no attorney's in the building. 
(Record, page 4<fl#17) 
18. Petitioner informed Jane Doe #1 that he had just seen Brent 
Langston enter the building, and Jane Doe #1 responded that he had left. 
(Less than 2 minutes had expired since Petitioner entered the Office.) 
Petitioner again insisted to speak to an attorney and Jane Doe #1 responded 
that all the attorneys were over at the courthouse. Jane Doe #1 lied to 
Petitioner in two (2) instances. (Record, page 4 <fl #18) 
19. Petitioner immediately went to the courthouse and no attorneys 
were there. He check the foyer and the courtrooms and all were empty. 
(Record, page 4<fl#19) 
20. The above facts stated in IS #11 through #19, constituted 
Petitioner's second (2nd) G. R. A. M. A. request denial. (Record, page 4 <f  #20) 
21. On Thursday, 10 August 1995, at approximately 9:00 am., Petitioner 
again attempted to gain access to the Law Library at the Washington County 
Attorney's Office at 178 N. 200 East in St. George, Utah, to exercise his 1st 
Amendment Right to access to public documents contained at that location. 
(Record, page 4 <$ #21) 
22. Petitioner asked the secretary (Jane Doe #3) who was standing there, 
for access to the Law Library. The secretary informed Petitioner that the Law 
Library was not available or open to the public, and she made no effort to offer 
or allow him beyond the door blocking access. This constitutes Petitioner's 
third (3rd), in person, G. R. A. M. A. Request. (Record, page 4 q #22) 
23. The above facts stated in I I #21 & #22, constituted Petitioner's 
third (3rd) G. R. A. M. A. request denial. (Record, page 4 q #23) 
24. On Friday, 11 August 1995, at approximately 8:45 am., Petitioner 
again attempted to gain access to the Law Library at the Washington County 
tttorney's Office at 178 N. 200 East in St. George, Utah, to exercise his 1st 
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Amendment Right to access to public documents contained at that 
location. (Record9 page 5 <fl #24) 
25. Petitioner asked the receptionist (Jane Doe #1) who was sitting there, 
for access to the Law Library. She shook her head "no." Petitioner asked her for 
her name and she again refused to give it to him. (Record9 page 5 <f #25j 
26. Jana Mock then stepped into view from behind the partition and 
informed Petitioner that she was only doing as instructed and that the Law 
Library was not available to him for use. This constitutes Petitioner's 
fourth (4th), in person, G. R. A. M. A. Request. (Record, page 5 5 #26) 
27. The above facts stated in TI #24 through #26, constituted 
Petitioner's fourth (4th) G. R. A. M. A. request denial. (Record, page 5 % #27) 
28. On Monday, 14 August 1995, at approximately 9:30 am., 
Petitioner again attempted to gain access to the Law Library at the 
Washington County Attorney's Office at 178 N. 200 East in St. George, 
Utah, to exercise his 1st Amendment Right to access to public documents 
contained at that location. (Record, page 5 <f  #28) 
29. Petitioner asked the receptionist (Jane Doe #1) who was sitting 
there, for access to the Law Library. She shook her head "no." Petitioner 
asked her for her name and she again refused to give it to him. (Record, 
page 5 q #29) 
30. The above facts stated in OT #28 & #29, constituted Petitioner's 
fifth (5th) G. R. A. M. A. request denial. (Record, page 5 <fl #30) 
31. On 9 August 1995, Petitioner submitted a written G. R. A. M. A. 
request to the custodian of the records of the Washington County 
Attorney's Office, which was denied by Eric Ludlow, by letter on 16 August 
1995. (Record, page 5 q #31) 
32. The description of the records sought to be inspected include, but 
are not limited to: United States Code: Pacific Reporter, all volumes; Pacific 
Reporter 2nd. Vol's. 1 through the present; Pacific Reporter Digest. 1st, 2nd, & 
3rd editions; American Jurisprudence, all volumes; Words and Phrases, all 
volumes; Corpus Juris Secundum, all volumes; American Law Review. 1st, 2nd, 
3rd, 4th, & Federal editions, all volumes; Utah Law Review, all volumes; 
Federal Reports, all volumes, U. S. Reports. Lawyer's edition, all volumes; 
Black's Law Dictionary: and any other reference material, book, or periodical 
maintained in the Law Library or any attorneys' offices housed at the Wash-
ington County Attorney's Office at the above address. (Record, page 6 <f  #32) 
33. The Law Library in question remains open to "licensed" attorneys, 
establishing a special class of persons in Utah, and violating the provisions of 
establishment of a title of nobility. (Record, page 6 <f  #33) 
34. On 11 August 1995, pursuant to Washington County Ordinance No. 
529, at f 10(B)(1), Petitioner filed an administrative appeal to the Washington 
County Commission. After twenty-one (21) days passed, Petitioner petitioned 
the District Court for judicial review of the Washington County's denials of his 
G. R. A. M. A. Requests. (Record, page 6 5f #34) 
35. The Law Library at the Washington County Attorney's Office at 178 
No. 200 East, in St. George, Utah, has traditionally been open to the public. 
(Record, page 6 <R #35) 
36. The Petitioner in this cause of action has used the Law Library at 
the Washington County Attorney's Office at 178 No. 200 East, in St. George, 
Utah, since September 1989, establishing a tradition of six (6) years of 
exercising his constitutional right of free access, pursuant to the 1st and 14th 
amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (Record, page 6 <3 #36) 
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37. It is necessary and imperative that Petitioner have free access to 
the Law Library at the Washington County Attorney's Office at 178 No. 200 
East, in St. Gorge, Utah, as to deprive him of such also denies him his 
constitutional right of self representation to the various lawsuits (including 
this one) he presently has pending. (Record, page 7 <J[ #37j 
38. It is entirely unreasonable for the Washington County Attorney 
to expect the Petitioner, who is indigent, to travel outside Washington 
County, to Utah County, Salt Lake County, and even outside Utah to a 
foreign state, namely Nevada, to exercise his rights to free access of public 
documents and self representation of his law suits. (Record, page 7 <fl #38) 
39. Judge Beacham, presiding in the Court below, asserts in his 30 
November 1995, JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL, that Petitioner failed to meet 
the requirement of Rule 56, suggesting an improper or absence of supporting 
affidavit. (Record, page 148, last paragraph) 
40. Judge Beacham, ruled in his JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL, that 
Respondent's MOTION TO DISMISS, was "clearly a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted." 
(Record, page 149, first paragraph) 
41. Judge Beacham found in his JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL, that 
the term "public documents", are not defined in G. R. A. M. A. (Record, 
page 150, first paragraph) 
42. The "GRAMA" Judge Beacham refers to is presumed to mean the 
Utah Government Records Access and Management Act. U. C. A. §63-2-101 et 
seq. (Not in Record) 
43. G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(a) defines "Record" to 
mean all "books, letters, documents. [etc.T Therefore, a "document" is a 
"record" and Petitioner's use of the word "document" is no different than if he 
were to use the word "record." The words "document" and "record" are 
synonymous. (Not in Record) 
44. G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-103(17) defines "public record" to 
mean "a record that is not private, controlled, or protected and that is not 
exempt from disclosure as provided in Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b). [Subsection 
63-2-201 (3)(b) is not applicable in this particular case.] (Not in Record) 
45. G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-201(2) also states that, "All records 
are public unless otherwise expressly provided by statute." (Not in Record) 
46. Judge Beacham, referencing G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-
103(18)(b)(vi) ruled in his JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL, that "The fatal flaw in 
the Petition is that books [which were records Petitioner sought to inspect] are 
not records to which GRAMA applies." (Record, page 149, first paragraph) 
47. As indicated in <I #43, above, G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-
103(18)(a) defines "Record" to mean all "books, [etc.f Therefore, Judge 
Beacham's ruling in his JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL, is in error. (Not in 
Record) 
48. "Non-record" as referred to by Judge Beacham in his JUDGMENT OF 
DISMISSAL, [Record, page 151, first paragraph] is not defined under G. R. 
A. M. A. (Not in Record) 
49. Judge Beacham erroneously found in his JUDGMENT OF 
DISMISSAL, that Petitioner conceded that the subject "books and other 
materials" petitioner sought, were in fact "contained in the collections of 
libraries open to the public." (Record, page 150, last paragraph) 
50. Petitioner did not concede such facts [see V #49, immediately above] 
as represented by Judge Beacham, and here asserts that the operative phrase of 
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the section of G. R. A. M. A. Judge Beacham refers to is "contained in the 
collections of libraries open to the public. (Not in Record) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT 1. Petitioner argues that the District Court below did not properly 
apply the appropriate standard of review for a MOTION TO DISMISS. 
The Court below did not construe the facts alleged in the PETITION, as 
true, and in a light most favorable to the Petitioner. 
The District Court below misconstrued Petitioner's facts alleged, 
and even misrepresents, in its JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL, the actual 
facts Petitioner alleged. 
Petitioner also argues the public's right to access. 
POINT 2. Petitioner argues that there is not a definition of "non-record" 
contained in G. R. A. M. A., nor does the statute even contemplate any 
items or categories classified as "non-records." 
POINT 3. Petitioner argues that the District Court below improperly 
applied U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(b)(vi) to the facts of this case and stands 
U. C. A §63-2-103(18)(a) on its head. 
POINT 4. Petitioner argues that he or any other individual participating in 
their self-represented governmental scheme, cannot be compelled or 
obligated to travel beyond the boundaries of his county, or to foreign 
lands, in order to exercise his rights to access to public documents and 
participate in his government. Particularly where his local government 
possess the very documents and records he seeks to inspect. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS 
MOTION TO DISMISS? IN OTHER WORDS, WAS PETITIONER'S 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF G. R. A. M. A. REQUEST 
DENIALS FATALLY FLAWED? 
"If the government is given the unfettered discretion to decide what 
information to make available to the press and public, it has the power to 
distort the information and hide the truth. The first amendment guarantees of 
free speech and free press protect our right to freely criticize the government 
without fear of censorship by the government. But censorship in speaking and 
publishing is not the only form of censorship that must be prevented. The 
process of filtering information—selectively releasing some information while 
withholding other information—can be effectively used to prevent criticism and 
hide mistakes. The first amendment guarantees apply to both forms of 
censorship/' Soc'u of Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor. 616F.Supp. 
569, 576 (D.Utah 1985). cited in Society of Professional Journalists v. Briaas et 
iL, 675 F. Supp 1308, 1309 (D.Utah 1987) 
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That same Court agreed and held "that there is a constitutional right 
of access to public documents.n let 
In Richmond Newspapers. Inc. v. Virginia. Justice Stevens noted that 
"the core of the First Amendment is access to information about the 
operation and functioning of government." 448 U.S. 555, 583-84, 100 S.Ct 
2814, 2830-31, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980), cited in Societu of Professional 
Journalists v. Briaas et al. Id. 
In 1986, the Utah Legislature enacted the Archives and Records Service 
Act and in 1991, redefined and recodified it as the Government Records 
Access and Management Act (G. R. A. M. A,). Enacting the Archives Act, the 
Legislature articulated and memorialized the following public policy: 
In enacting this act, the Legislature recognizes two 
fundamental constitutional rights: (a) the right of privacy in 
relation to personal data gathered by state agencies, and 
(b) the public's right of access to information concerning 
the conduct of the public's business* 
Petitioner asserts it is axiomatic that he has a constitutional right of 
access to public documents. 
In reviewing the dismissal of Petitioner's action, the Court must view 
the PETITION and all reasonable inferences in his favor, see Mounteer v. 
Utah Power & Light Co.. 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991) In addition, Dismissal is 
only appropriate when it appears to a certainty that the Petitioner would 
not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in 
support of his claims, see Freeaard v. First W. Nat'l Bank. 738P.2d 614, 616 
(Utah 1987) 
In ruling on Respondent's MOTION TO DISMISS, the Court below 
observed, "With respect to the merits of respondent's Motion to Dismiss, the 
Court first notes that respondent has not raised issues concerning the formal 
adequacy of the Petition or with respect to petitioner's compliance with 
required administrative procedures. While it appears to the Court that the 
Petition may not meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404 and it is 
not clear from the file whether petitioner in fact exhausted his administrative 
remedies, ..." It is clear by the Courts' remarks regarding Petitioner's 
administrative remedies or his pursuit of those avenues for redress, the Court 
below did not take cognitive recognition of Petitioner's statement of facts. 
Petitioner clearly alleged with a verified PETITION that he administratively 
attempted to personally inspect public records in the Washington County 
attorneys' possession, then filed a written request under Washington Countys' 
Ordinance #529 (G. R. A. M. A.), and then pursued his administrative appeal, 
which was denied him by way of non-response. 
Petitioner understands that the Court below asserts that its decision was 
not controlled or affected by its erroneous observation of Petitioner's statement 
of facts, however, Petitioner makes the point that the Court below clearly 
demonstrated its own error and inattention to Petitioner's stated facts, which 
the Court was obligated to construe as true. Instead, the Court below 
indicated that it was not clear as to whether Petitioner had exhausted his 
administrative remedies or whether he had complied with the appeal process 
under G. R. A. M. A. This demonstrates shear lack of attention to this case 
and Petitioner's verified statement of facts. 
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The Court below indicates that it decided this case as a matter of law, 
pursuant to G. R. A. M. A. The Court first observes Petitioner's use of the 
term "public documents," and claims such term is not "defined in GRAMA 
[sic]" The Court below clearly misinterprets the plain language of the 
statute. 
G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(a) defines "Record" to mean all 
"books, letters, documents. [etc.T Therefore, a "document" is a "record" and 
Petitioner's use of the word "document" is no different than if he were to use 
the word "record." The words "document" and "record" are synonymous. 
G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-103(17) defines "public record" to 
mean "a record that is not private, controlled, or protected and that is not 
exempt from disclosure as provided in Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b). 
[Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b) is not applicable in this particular case.] Therefore, 
the logical conclusion may be inferred that Petitioner's use of the term 
"public document" is circumscribed within the language of G. R. A. M. A. In 
addition U. C. A. §63-2-201(2) also states that, "All records are public unless 
otherwise expressly provided by statute." 
The Court below then goes on to recognize that Petitioner did in fact 
use the word "record." OH MY GOSH! But then it simply passes on to its 
next misconstruance and misapplication of G. R. A. M. A. 
The Court below observed that, "Paragraph 32 of the Petition specifies, 
however, that 4the records sought to be inspected' are in fact specifically 
named books 'and any other reference material, book, or periodical' 
maintained in the Washington County Attorney's law library, the fatal flaw 
in the Petition is that such books are not records to which GRAMA applies." 
G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2~103(18)(a) defines "Record" to mean all 
"books, [etc.r The Court below merely passed over that applicable portion of 
the statute to misapply an inapplicable section to Petitioner's cause of action. 
The Court below stated, "GRAMA clearly provides that the term 'record' as used 
in GRAMA does not refer to 
books and other materials that are cataloged, indexed, or 
inventoried and contained in the collections of libraries 
open to the public, regardless of physical form or 
characteristics of the material. 
U.CA § 63-2-103(18)(b)(vi)" 
In a paramount effort to construe the statute in light least favorable to 
the Petitioner, the Court below continued with the following erroneous 
observation. "Respondent asserts, petitioner appears to concede, and the 
Court takes notice of the fact that the "books and other materials" identified 
by petitioner as the subject of his Petition are in fact "contained in the 
collections of libraries open to the public/ Petitioner conceded no such thing! 
The Court goes on in an attempt to elucidate, but in actuality it muddies its 
findings and further casts aspersion on the intent of the Legislature for open 
access of public records maintained by the Washington County Attorney. 
At this point the Petitioner must go to extraordinary lengths to analyze 
the Courts' error and the misapplication of its conclusion to the facts of this 
case. 
The operative phrase of the section of the statute the Court below 
references is, "contained in the collections of libraries open to the public," 
Petitioner will repeat this for emphasis, "libraries open to the public," The 
PETITION clearly alleges a new partition and locked doors now stand between 
the Petitioner and the records he seeks access to. Such facts clearly 
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demonstrate a lack of access, and would be reasonably construed as not 
being open to the public! The moment the Law Library housed at the 
Washington County Attorney's office, was closed to free and open access by 
the public, and remained closed even after request for access was made by 
the Petitioner, such library no longer could be classified as public, and G. R. 
A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(b)(vi}9 referred to by the Court below, was 
not applicable to bar Petitioner's redress through his PETITION FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW, or grant the remedy sought by Respondent's MOTION TO 
DISMISS, "as a matter of law/ As a matter of law, the Court below did err. 
The Washington County Attorney is the custodian of "public records" 
which he is denying access to by the public, and in contemptuous violation 
of G. R. A. M. A. 
POINT 2. DOES THE UTAH GOVERNMENT RECORDS ACCESS AND 
MANAGEMENT ACT. U.C.A. §63-2-101 ETSEQ, IDENTIFY, 
DEFINE, OR EVEN CONTEMPLATE "NON-RECORDS?" 
Petitioner contends that the answer to this question is an absolute 
"No!" Respondent and the Court stretch far afield to liberally construe G. 
R. A. M. A. to define "non-record." 
The scheme under which G. R. A. M. A. operates suggests a posture of 
openness and unrestrained (free) access. G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-
301(3) clearly states "The list of public records in this section is not 
exhaustive and should not be used to limit access to records. 
The concept postulated by the Respondent and the Court below, 
suggesting that G. R. A. M. A. defines those records sought by the Petitioner as 
"non-records" is not merely novel, it is outright preposterous, and suggests 
mental imbalance and a retreat from reason, logic, and common sense. It is 
clear that as students of the law, those individuals representing the 
Respondent and the Court below fully understand the ramifications of the 
court decisions heretofore cited by the Petitioner, which declare axiomatically 
his constitutional right to access to public "documents/ 
As pointed out in Petitioner's POINT 1 above, the Court below nitpicks at 
Petitioner's frequent use of the word "document" in his pleadings, instead of 
the Courts' more favored term "record." In the Briags case, J. Green favored 
the word "document." OH MY GOSH! Isn't that what the Petitioner used? 
In either case, the Utah Legislature did not appear so fastidious, it 
merely expressed a broader intent by articulating "the public's right of access to 
information concerning the conduct of the public's business." ML 
The Respondents' intent is clearly to deprive the Petitioner his 
constitutional right of access to information regarding his governments' 
business, which intent is evidently supported by the Court below. Is shark 
courtesy factored in here somewhere? 
There are but four (4) definitions of records found in G. R. A. M. A., and 
none of them identify with "non-records." 
The clear and plain language of the statute belies the Courts' ruling that 
G. R. A. M. A. defines "non-record." Using the Courts' power of reasoning, to 
define an animal that was not a horse the dialog would go something like this. 
Dummy claims he saw a "horse." Dummy can't have seen a horse, it 
was actually not a horse because Farmer John defines what Dummy saw as 
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horses, equine animals, saddled creatures used 
for riding, and other four legged mammals characterized 
by hooves, pointy ears, manes, and long flowing tails 
with horse hair, that are cataloged, itemized, 
characterized and otherwise crossbred with jackasses. 
Therefore, what Dummy saw was a "non-horse.". 
What the statute, referred to by the Court below is actually saying, is 
that those documents that might be sought, pursuant to G. R. A. M. A., 
from a government entity that is a public library, are not available through 
G. R. A. M. A. because a library that is "open to the public," means exactly 
that — OPEN TO THE PUBLIC! A request pursuant to G. R. A. M. A. made 
to a public library is as preposterous as the Courts' explanation that the 
"records" Petitioner seeks are actually "non-records." Such a request to a 
public library is unnecessary. G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(b)(vi), 
is intended to lend reason, logic, and common sense to an otherwise stupid 
bureaucrat. It is not for the use the Court below has put it to. 
POINT 3. DID THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY APPLY U. C. A. §63-2-
103(18)(b)(vi) TO PETITIONER'S CASE? 
Petitioner has heretofore argued that the operative phrase that the 
Court below improperly applies is "libraries open to the public." Petitioner's 
argument in that regard was more fully expressed in POINT 2 above, 
however, Petitioner would vigorously argue that the Court below improperly 
applied U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(b)(vi) to his case, and Respondents' MOTION 
TO DISMISS should have been denied. 
The Court below reasons that "The Utah Legislature has made the access 
provisions of GRAMA inapplicable to the books and materials in the law library 
of the Washington County Attorney because those books and materials are 
available in public libraries." The Court below errs in this reasoning, which is 
also tied to Petitioner's argument found in the following POINT 4. 
If Washington County had a public library which housed the documents, 
records, or whatever term you want to use to describe the information 
regarding the conduct of the public's business, then the reasoning of the Court 
below might be considered, however, that reasoning is even faulty. 
Petitioner did not pursue his requests, under G. R. A. M. A., to a public 
library. His requests were specifically directed to a governmental entity 
(Washington County Attorney) that had purposely closed access to the public 
records (documents) it houses and maintains. In this regard, the Courts 
reasoning is faulty. 
Even considering the scenario suggested by the Court below, that 
GRAMA is inapplicable to the documents in the law library at the County 
Attorneys' office because those books and materials are available in public 
libraries, such reasoning does not comport with the intent of G. R. A. M. A., 
the Utah Legislature, and the various appellate court decisions on the subject. 
Differences might be found, that are essential to the knowledge obtained, 
from otherwise identical documents (records) located in separate governmental 
repositories. It is unreasonable and irresponsible for one (1) governmental 
entity to point to another governmental entity and claim, "You can't have what 
I have because they have it over there. You go get it from them." 
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In this capacity, the Court below has seriously damaged the integrity 
and purpose of G. R. A. M. A. Likewise, the Court below assumed facts not 
in evidence, and failed to construe the facts alleged in Petitioner's verified 
PETITION in a light most favorable to him. 
This argument actually returns to Petitioner's POINT 1, challenging 
the Courts' dismissal in favor of Respondents' MOTION TO DISMISS. 
POINT 4. CAN PETITIONER BE EXPECTED OR OBLIGATED BY HIS 
GOVERNMENT TO TRAVEL BEYOND THE GEOGRAPHIC 
BOUNDARIES OF THE COUNTY IN WHICH HE LIVES, IN 
ORDER FOR HIM TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO THE RECORDS HE 
SEEKS. IN OTHER WORDS, IS THERE AN ISSUE OF 
CONVENIENCE AT PLAY TO DENY PETITIONER ACCESS TO 
THE RECORDS HE SEEKS? 
The Court below turns against the Petitioner the issue of his 
indigence. With inconceivable lack of common sense, the Court below 
attempts to imbue Legislative intent into G. R. A. M. A. which is not there. 
The issue of inconvenience rises with the Respondent, not the Petitioner as 
the Court below attempts to portray. 
The Respondent has persistently clouded Petitioner's G. R. A. M. A. 
Requests with a plethora of excuses, which mostly whine about 
convenience, or lack of it. 
We don't have the staff. 
We don't have the facility. 
We are troubled with theft. 
We are troubled with threats of terrorism. 
We don't have privacy any more. 
We don't have the equipment. 
You can go somewhere else to get what you want. (ie. Nevada) 
Petitioner has not yet been afforded the ability to discover whether 
Respondents' whining over convenience, as indicated above, is valid, and he 
does not represent Respondents' excuses in this APPELLANTS BRIEF to grant 
any degree of validity to them. 
The decision of the Court below, regarding convenience, ties itself back to 
its misapplication of G. R. A. M. A. at U. C. A. §63-2-103(18)(b)(vi), which 
Petitioner has heretofore demonstrated to be in error. 
It does not matter one way or the other that the Legislature did not 
provide an indigence exception or an inconvenience exception to the statutory 
exclusions the Court below claims. It is clear, however, that the Court below 
was influenced in its decision by its own faulty reasoning. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear and evident that Respondent chooses not to comply with 
Petitioner's Constitutional right to access to public documents. Prior appellate 
courts, both state and federal, have made the right axiomatic. This court must 
review the decision of the Court below in a light most favorable to the 
Petitioner and reverse its decision to dismiss Petitioner's claims. 
WHEREFORE: Petitioner prays for relief in the following: 
1. Reverse the decision of the District Court below. 
2. Remand the case back to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this Court's opinion, granting the Petitioner access to 
the public documents housed at the Washington County Attorneys' 
Office. 
3. Award costs and fees to the Petitioner, on appeal. 
4. Award any other remedies this Court deems just and appropriate. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH M. WISD£N, J 
Petitioner, } JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
vs, ) 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, J 
Respondent. } Civil No. 950501367 AA 
This matter was commenced by the filing of a "Petition for Review of 
G.R, A.fVLA. Request Denials" which was served on Washington County on September 
12, 1395. A Default Certificate was fitaJ October 3, 1995. On the previous day, 
however, October 2, 1995, counsel for Washington County had served by maJI a 
Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum in response to the Petition. 
Thereafter, petitioner filed an "Opposition" to the Motion together with petitioner's 
Motion for Summary Judgment On October 23, 1995, petitioner save notice to 
submit both the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Summary Judgment to the 
Court for decision. 
DEFAULT CERTIFICATE 
Petitioner's "Opposition": Motion for Summary Judgment and Notices to 
Submit all recite that "Respondent is in default" so that *no service is required", citing 
Rule 55 (8H2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Porakrr*. That assertion is factually and 
legally incorrect. Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure required respondent to 
* ADDENDUM 
"serve" Its response en or before October'2, 1995. UR.CP, Rule 5(b) allowed 
respondent to serve its response to the Petition by mailing it to petitioner at hie known 
address. Respondent served its Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum by 
mail on October 10,1996, The rules 4Q not require that response to be filed with the 
Clerk within twenty days, but only that the response be "served/ Consequently, 
although respondent's Motion md Memorandum did not appear in the Court's file ort 
October 3, respondent was in fact not in default. The Court considers this fact to 
constitute good cause to set aside the entry of default and does hereby set aside the 
entry of default made on October 3* See Rule 55|c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Petitioner's: Motion for Summery Judgment faffs to meet the requirements of 
U.R.C.P. Rule 56 and of Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration in several 
respects including, without (imitation, improper and incomplete form, the absence of 
supporting affidavits, end petitioner's failure to serve the Motion upon respondent 
{With respect to the Jest stated defect, petitioner's repeated assertion that service 
upon respondent was not required, Mowed by petitioner's filing of Notices to Submit 
which recite that respondent has not filed any opposing memorandum or pleading, is 
at least disingenuous.} These defects in petitioner's Motion are sufficient ground for 
the Court to deny the Motion. In addition, however, the Court finds as a matter of 
law that petitioner is not emitted to the relief prayed for in petitioner's Motion, as 
explained below. On these bases, petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
denied. 
ENDUM #1 2 
•LLANT'S BRIEF — Utah Court of ADDeals Case Mn oenno< ™ 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
In response to respondent's Motion to Dismiss, petitioner asserts thai 
respondent** Motion dots not constitute a proper response to the Petition and thai 
the Motion fails to meat the requirements of Hula 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. These assertions are legally incorrect. With respect to the facts of the 
case* respondent's Memorandum recites only petitioner's own a Negations, without 
controverting or adding to the facts alleged, After making its argument, respondent's 
Memorandum concludes thai the Petition should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
Respondent's Motion Is clearly a Rule 12tbH6) motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Respondent's failure to recite "Rule 12* 
does not change the clear subsume* of the Motion, Petitioner further asserts that 
respondent's Motion to dismiss is not art "ANSWER later to the Petra'ort* This 
assertion may be factually correct, but it is legally irrelevant. Under Rufe 12, 
respondent was required to make this Motion "before pleading." The Court finds that 
[petitioner's "Opposition* to respondent's Motion to Dismiss raises no legitimate issues 
of fact or law. 
With respect to the merits of respondent's Motion to Dismiss, ^he Court first 
notes that respondeat has not raised issues concerning the formal adequacy of the 
Petition or with respect to petitioner's compliance with required administrative 
procedures. While it appears to the Court that the Petition may not meet fta 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. 163*2-404 and it m not clear from the file whether 
petitioner m fact exhausted his administrative remedies* those issues were not raised 
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by respondent end die not affect or control the Court's decision. 
This matter cam be decided as a matter of (aw, however, on the basis of the 
Government Records Access and Management Act, U.C.A. S 63-2*101 et s&q, 
{"GRAMA*!. The Court first notes that the Petition repeatedly uses the term "public 
documents'** which is not defined in GRAMA, Paragraph 32 of the Petition specifies, 
however, that "the records sought to be inspected" ere in fact specifically named 
books "and any other reference materiel, book, or periodical" maintained In the 
Washington County Attorney's law library. The fata! ffaw in the Petition is thmi sweh 
books are not records to which (SRAMA applies. GRAMA clearly provides that the 
term "record* ee ueed in GRAMA doee not refer to 
books and other materials that ^r& catalogued, indexed, Of 
inventoried and contained in the collections of libraries open 
to the public, regardless of physical form or characteristics 
of the material* 
UX.A. S63-2»103i18HbHvO. 
Respondent asserts, petitioner appears to concede, end the Court takes notice 
of the fact that the "books and other materials" identified foy petitioner as the subject 
of hi* Petition are m fact "'contained in the collections of libraries open to the pyblic,1T 
Consequently* the copies of sue!*, books and materials which are m the Washington 
County Attorney's law library are not subject to GRAMA because they are specifically 
excluded from the definition of "records", Le., those documents whlth are subject to 
GRAMA. The Utah Legislature has made the access provisions of GRA&IA 
inapplicable to the books and materials in the law library of the Washington County 
Attorney because those books and materials are available sn pubic libraries. 
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Petitioner crtes U>CA. § 63-2-201 i3)M for the proposition that a "public 
record" Is a record that is not private, controlled or protected and that is not exempt 
from disclosure. Regardless of whether petitioner's Interpretation of this statute is 
correct, it is irrelevant. The statute cited by petitioner identifies "records" which "are 
not public/ The books and materials sought by petitioner are not "records'* at afl 
under GRAMA and* therefore, could not be "public records.* 
Petitioner seems to assert that the public libraries housing the books and 
materials which he seeks are not conveniently located and that, due to his claimed 
indigence, he cannot reasonably be expected to travel to any library location other 
than the Washington County Attorney's law library. The Legislature did not provide 
that a petitionee's simple assertion of inconvenience {i.e., that public libraries are not 
convenient to a particular petitioner) would eliminate the statutory exclusion of such 
books and materials from the definrtkm of the term "record"* so that those books and 
materials would ihtn be subject to GRAMA. In other words, the Legislature did not 
provide an indigence exception or an inconvenience exception to the statutory 
exclusion of those books and materials from the scope of OR AM A, 
Petitioner further asserts that past public use of the Washington County 
Attorney's law library "has established a tradftbn of open public access/' Petitioner 
cites no authority supporting a right of access based on "tradition", however* and 
<3RAMA contains no "tradition" exception to the exclusions from Its $zop&. 
Consequently, the Court finds that the Petition fails to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted, The Petition is hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the 
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merits. The Court specifically reserves smy question regarding respondent's 
entrtiement to attorney's fees and costs in this matter* 
DATED this day of November, 1985. 
O » C ^ H ^ S S ^ ^ __ 
G, RAND 8EACHAM 
Fifth District Court Judge 
J hereby certify that on this /3t d*y of Jjfa , 199S, i mailed a 
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing, first-class postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Joseph M. Wisden 
465 South Bluff Street #160 
St. George, U? 84770 
Robert R, Wallace, Esq. 
Hanson, Epperson & Smith, P.C. 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P. 0- Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
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